Programmer-Guided Reliability in Chapel

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System Reliability at Extreme Scale

• All trends suggest increasing concerns about system reliability at extreme scales
  – Increasing node/component counts
  – Lithographic process shrinkage
  – Near-threshold voltage operation
  – Dynamic power management (thermal variability)

• Silent data corruption (SDC) is particularly insidious
  – Transient error causing bits to get flipped in storage, transmission, or computational logic
  – Typically due to cosmic ray strike, thermal or electrical fluctuation, etc.
  – Hard to get a handle on (they’re “silent”!)
How to Address Reliability Concerns?

• To date, applications have generally relied on hardware to detect (and where possible correct) errors

• Hardware-only solutions cost $, power, performance
  – Also tend to be blunt instruments

• Can we use software-based or HW+SW approaches to provide more tailored, more “efficient” solutions
  – Some parts of program are more vulnerable than others
  – Protecting key parts application may suffice

• Programmer generally knows much more about their code than the compiler can infer
  – Need ways to capture and communicate to compiler/system
Our Focus

• Understanding impact of and responses to transient errors at application level
  – Particularly silent data corruption

• Software-based techniques for error detection/correction
  – Potential for more flexible and tailored approach to reliability
  – Leverage programmer understanding of application
  – Can use special features of HW or lower SW layers, as available

• Understand efficacy of error detectors and their costs in energy and performance
  – (In time) identify patterns and automate, as possible
  – Locate application in R-E-P trade space and move around in controlled manner

• Not addressing fail-stop errors in this project
  – Plenty of interesting R&D there too, but orthogonal
Our Approach

1. Select demonstration applications

2. Instrument applications with various error detectors or correctors
   – Develop language extensions to capture such annotations and succinctly express common error detection patterns

3. Measure efficacy of error detectors, and their impact on performance and power through fault injection experiments
   – Develop models of resilience, energy, and performance (R-E-P) behaviors

4. Develop runtime back-end to dynamically move application in R-E-P trade space
   • Using Chapel as implementation language
## Selected Demonstration Applications

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>SSCA#1</td>
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<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Partial (1\textsuperscript{st} of 4 kernels)</td>
<td>Under study</td>
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<td>SSCA#3</td>
<td>Synthetic aperture radar and I/O</td>
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<td>LULESH</td>
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<td>Planned</td>
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Error Detectors and Correctors

- Code provided by programmer to detect and possibly correct (data) errors
  - May utilize properties of algorithm, problem space, domain
  - Like assertions or contracts, see also containment domains

- Detectors will vary in efficacy (ability to detect errors), and have costs in both performance and energy usage

- Prefer detectors with “knobs” giving variable levels of protection (with different costs)
  - i.e. frequency of verifying checksums

- Core capability is detection of errors
  - Correction typically more complicated, requires more resources, may or may not be feasible
Error Detection Based on Problem Symmetry (LULESH)

• LULESH is a shock hydrodynamics code that assumes a spherically-symmetric problem
  – Computation retains some symmetrically redundant elements

• Error detector exploits symmetry to detect and correct
  – Correction replaces with average (not the literally correct value)
  – Iterative algorithm eventually completes the “correction”

• Possible “knobs”
  – Frequency of verification
  – Density of sampling

```c
void symmetry_error_detectorNrecovery() {
    // Loop over 3d problem space
    for (plane=0; plane<edgeNodes; ++plane) {
        for (row=0; row<edgeNodes; ++row) {
            for (col=0; col<edgeNodes; ++col) {
                // Compare the current position vec.
                // with three symmetric counterparts
                if (asymmetry is found) {
                    // Update the current position vector
                    // with average symmetric partners
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```
Error Detection Based on Known Ranges (SSCA#2)

• Graph analytics application
  – Computes betweenness centrality metrics
  – Primary data structure is a table of vertices, each with a weight and set of edges, read-only after generated

• Error detector checks that edges connect to valid vertices
  – Would not detect an erroneous entry that pointed to a valid vertex
  – Does not correct errors

• Possible “knobs”
  – Frequency of verification
  – Density of sampling

```chapel
proc checkEdges()
{
    return || reduce [ s in vertices ]
                (|| reduce [ n in Neighbors(s)]
                 (n > 2**SCALE || n < 0));
}
```
Using Checksums to Detect Errors (SSCA#3)

• Synthetic aperture radar processing application
  – Two stages process SAR data into images
  – Two stages compare images for target detection

• Error detector computes a checksum on a large “state” data structure which is read-mostly
  – Detection only
  – Correction would require redundant storage of state

• Possible “knobs”
  – Frequency of verification
  – Strength of checksum

```c
if(!crc_cmp((crc_t *)state, sizeof(state_t),state_crc_chksum)) {
    fprintf(stderr,"\nPossible bit flip in 'state' struct\n");
    exit(1);
}
```
Blockwise Checksum with Rollback (SSCA#1)

- Bioinformatics optimal pattern matching application
  - Pairwise local alignment of sequences (Smith-Waterman)

- Error detector checksums large sequence data structures in blocks
  - Checksums can be verified as sequence is processed

- Possible “knobs”
  - Block size
  - Frequency of verification
  - Strength of checksum
• A key integer value is known to have a limited range (21 bits)
• Pack three copies into one 64-bit integer
  – Triply redundant storage

```
Vp = uint21_rel_unpack(V(j));
V(j) = uint21_rel_pack(max(0, E, F(j), G));
if (uint21_rel_unpack(V(j)) >= minScore && W>0.0 &&
   uint21_rel_unpack(V(j))==G
   && (j==m || i==n ||
   weights(mainSeq(i+1), matchSeq(j+1))<=0.0))
{   // core computation
    considerAdding(V, goodEnds, goodScores,
                   minScore, report, minSeparation, I,
                   j, sortReports, maxReports);
}
E = max(E - gapExtend,
        uint21_rel_unpack(V(j)) - gapFirst);
```
OO Methodology for Error Detectors in Chapel

- Construct classes to provide variable levels of protection to data and methods that provide different levels of protection/detection in processing.

- Provide “quality of protection” weights for different approaches.

- Provide methods to raise, lower, and reset (to highest or lowest) protection.
class \texttt{dot\_functor\_dmr} : \texttt{dot\_functor} {
    \texttt{var d1, d2;}
    \texttt{proc plevel() \{ return (2); \}}

    \texttt{proc run() : int \{ // Execute twice and compare}
        \texttt{const r1 = d1.run();}
        \texttt{const r2 = d2.run();}
        \texttt{assert(r1 == r2);}
        \texttt{return (r1);}
    \}}

    \texttt{proc pdown() : \texttt{dot}\_\texttt{functor} \{ // next protection level}
        \texttt{return (new \texttt{dot}\_\texttt{functor}\_\texttt{default}(d1.n, d1.x, d1.y));}
    \}}
}

\texttt{// create two protected arrays, level 1:}
\texttt{var p1 : array = new array\_bare(int, 3, v1);}
\texttt{var p2 : array = new array\_bare(int, 3, v2);}
\texttt{var d : \texttt{dot}\_\texttt{functor} = nil; var r : int = 0;}
\texttt{d = new \texttt{dot}\_\texttt{functor}\_\texttt{default}(3, p1, p2);}
\texttt{r = d.run();}

\texttt{// increase level of p1: 1 -> 2}
\texttt{pup(p1); d = new \texttt{dot}\_\texttt{functor}\_\texttt{default}(3, p1, p2);}
\texttt{r = d.run();}

\texttt{// reset p1 & p2's levels}
\texttt{pmin(p1); pmin(p2);}

\texttt{// increase the functor's level}
\texttt{pup(d); r = d.run();}
Fault Injection Studies

• Initially: exploratory, to help identify vulnerable code/data

• Then: characterize efficacy of detector as function of “knob” settings
  – Measure energy, performance costs
Vulnerabilities to Fault Injection (LULESH)

1-bit Fault Injection Results

- Completes with correct results
- Completes with incorrect results
- Execution aborts

Major program variables

Error (%)

1bF-NOREXIT
1bF-ABEXIT
Efficacy of Symmetry-Based Error Detector/Corrector (LULESH)

Fault Behaviors of LULESH (1-bit Fault)
(Relative Error TH = 1.0E-13, 6-decimal-place outputs)

Black blocks indicate erroneous results in which the error detector did not trigger.
Combining Error Detection with Checkpoint/Restart (LULESH)

Fault Behaviors of LULESH (1-bit Faults)
(Relative Error TH = 1.0E-13, 6-decimal-place outputs)

Pure checkpointing solution doesn’t protect against SDC
Combining algorithm-based detection with checkpoint-based recovery is quite effective
Magnitudes of Errors Observed (SSCA#2)

- Inject faults into edge lists only
- Inject only between computational kernels
  - In these examples, after kernel 3
- Look at results for betweenness centrality metric (Kernel 4)
  - Two approximate metrics (16, 32 starting vertices), exact metric
  - Variation due to errors significant larger in 16 metric than in 32 or exact
Comparing Different Checksums (SSCA#3)

- CRC and Fletcher checksums of data structure
  - Markedly different efficacies
  - CRC-32 catches all errors for these cases
  - Cost of all CRC variants is the same (< 6% variation)
  - Fletcher-16 more expensive than Fletcher-32

Errors Missed (up to 4096 b messages)

Performance (up to 256 kb messages)
Runtime Adaptation in R-E-P Trade Space

- Module in runtime to control “knobs” in error detectors
  - Informed by models of R-E-P behavior of detector

- Static settings (life of job) and dynamic control possible

Some approaches for dynamic control…

- Profile-based
  - Select error detectors based on execution phases in application profile

- Performance/energy-driven
  - Select best error detectors while staying within given E-P limits

- Symptom-based
  - Vary R depending on fault notifications

- Prediction-based
  - Choose R based on observed symptoms
  - Find best E-P point for chosen R
Extending Chapel to Support Programmer-Guided Reliability

• Initially
  – Programmer-provided code for error detection
    • May be intertwined with computational code
    • Can use OO techniques to “wrap up” a data structure with error detection
  – Need to be able to associate error detector control variable or reconfiguration routine with cost model

• Eventually
  – Identify reliability “patterns” that are common, reusable
  – Implement within module, or generate in compiler
  – Guide via annotations on target code

• Question
  – Try to cast as “regular code” or as directives/pragmas?
Possibilities for Registration of Detectors

As normal code?

```c
pgr.register( detector_name, reconfig, cost);
error detector // using R as parameter to define // level of protection
```

As a pragma?

```c
pragma pgr.register( detector_name, reconfig, cost);
error detector // using R as parameter to define // level of protection
```

As a structured comment?

```c
//$pgr register( detector_name, reconfig, cost);
error detector // using R as parameter to define // level of protection
```
Possible “Automatic” Instantiations of Common Error Detection Patterns

Array declaration with “protect” attribute

```chapel
const: D: domain(2) = [1..10, 1..10];
var A: [D] real protect(checksum);
```

Declare variable with limited range of validity

```chapel
var limited = float(-1.0, 1.0)
```

Task executed with triple redundancy

```chapel
begin(tmr) result = important(stuff);
```

Iterator declaration with “monotonic” contract

```chapel
iter squares(n: int): int monotonic {
  for i in 1..n do
    yield i*i;
}
```
Summary

• Trends suggest that errors are going to get worse
  – Silent data corruption is particularly worrisome

• Applications will need to play an active role in detecting (and correcting) errors

• Programmers know much about what could go wrong and the impact it could have

• Give programmers tools to capture that information in the code
  – Automate common error detection patterns

• Give runtime capability to manage programmer-provided error detection
  – Need to connect detectors to back-end

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